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Tom v. Innovative Home Systems, LLC, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 15 (Mar. 10, 2016)1
LICENSES: CONTRACTORS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
Summary:
The Court determine that the decision of the State Contractors’ Board closing homeowners’
complaint and directing contractor to make repairs to residence was not a final decision resolving
a contested case, as required to preclude a homeowner from relitigating whether contractor was
required to have an electrical license. The Court also determine that genuine issues of material fact
existed as to whether the contractor needed an electrical license and genuine issues of material fact
existed as to whether the contractor completed its contractual obligations to homeowner.
Background
Tom and Innovative Home Systems (“HIS”) entered into a contract in April 2012, in which
IHS agreed to install automation, sound, surveillance, and landscaping systems in Tom’s
residence. IHS then began work on the residence. IHS did not have an electrical contractor’s
license when it bid the contract and began the work. In September 2012, IHS applied for and
received, an electrical contractor’s license. IHS contends this license was needed for other projects
it would be working on, but not for the work on Tom’s residence. IHS continued working on the
Tom residence until December 2012. At that time, the parties disagreed on the performance of the
contract, Tom refused to tender further payment to IHS, and IHS consequently filed a notice of
lien against Tom’s residence. In response, Tom filed a consumer complaint with the Nevada State
Contractors’ Board (the Board), a state administrative agency, alleging that (1) IHS did not
complete certain parts of the contract in a workmanlike manner and (2) IHS bid the job and
performed the work without first obtaining the required electrical license.
An investigator for the Board investigated the matter and sent IHS a notice to correct, which
required IHS to correct nine of the items listed in the complaint. HS purportedly remedied the work
items identified by the investigator and responded with a letter that it did not need a license to
complete the work on Tom’s residence. The Board closed the case as resolved through a letter
signed by a compliance supervisor. The Board neither conducted an adversary proceeding to
determine the legal rights of the parties, nor issued a written decision specifically ruling on the
license issue.
IHS filed a complaint in district court against Tom alleging breach of contract, breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, foreclosure of notice of lien, and
declaratory relief. IHS also requested attorney fees. IHS then filed a motion for summary judgment
on its claims, arguing that an electrical license was not required for the work performed on Tom’s
residence and that its lien was proper and perfected. The District Court awarded summary
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judgement in favor of the contractor, determining that HIS did not need a license, awarded IHS
$1,144.37 in costs and $35,350.00 in attorney fees, and denied IHS’s unjust enrichment claim.
Discussion
Nevada’s licensing laws
The Court noted that the primary purpose of Nevada’s licensing statutes is to protect
the public against both faulty construction and financial irresponsibility. Anyone engaging in the
business or acting in the capacity of a contractor, or submitting a bid on a project, must be licensed
unless they are exempt from licensure.2 Under NAC 624.200(2)(d) an electrical license is required
for the installation, alteration and repair of systems that use fiber optics or do not exceed 91 volts,
including telephone systems, sound systems, cable television systems, closed circuit video
systems, satellite dish antennas, instrumentation and temperature controls, computer networking
systems and landscape lighting.3 Thus, if IHS performed any of the work described in NAC
624.200(2)(d) on Tom’s residence, it needed an electrical license in order to bid on and perform
the work.4
Licensure
The Court stated that, in resolving the licensing issue, the district court relied on
the Board's resolution of Tom's complaint, which the court found determinative of whether IHS
needed a license for the work it performed on Tom’s residence, thus giving that resolution
preclusive effect. The district court further concluded that the advisory opinions provided by IHS
also demonstrated that IHS did not need a license for the work it performed. The Court thus began
its examination of these issues by first considering whether the district court properly concluded
that the Board’s resolution of Tom's administrative complaint was dispositive evidence that IHS
did not need a license for the work performed on Tom’s residence. Thereafter, the Court considered
whether the district court’s reliance on the advisory opinions issued by the Board further
demonstrated that IHS did not need a license.
The District Court’s Reliance on the Board’s Decision
The Court emphasized that the district court essentially held that the Board’s
decision was entitled to preclusive effect on the question of whether a license was required so as
to bar Tom from relitigating that issue. Therefore, the Court analyzed claim preclusion and how
those legal principles apply in the administrative context. Claim and issue preclusion can apply in
the administrative context when an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and
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resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an opportunity to
litigate.5 An agency decision can result in issue or claim preclusion as to a subsequent decision
made by another court or a different agency.6 In order for either doctrine to apply to bar the
relitigation of a claim or issue, all the elements of the particular doctrine must be met. For claim
preclusion to apply, (1) the same parties or their privies must be involved in both cases, (2) a valid
final judgment must be entered in the first case, and (3) the subsequent action must be “based on
the same claims or any part of them that were or could have been brought in the first case.7 After
laying out the elements for claim and issue preclusion the Court then turned to the issue of whether
the Board’s resolution of Tom’s administrative complaint met these elements such that it barred
Tom from relitigating the licensing issue in the district court.
The Board
To determine if the Board’s resolution of Tom’s administrative complaint met the
elements of claim and issue preclusion, the Court examined the statutory powers of the Board and
its role in resolving complaints. The Board is vested with all of the functions and duties relating
to the administration of [NRS Chapter 624].8 This includes adjudicating contested cases.9 Related
to its investigative duties and ability to resolve contested cases, the Board can also make findings
of fact regarding the issues presented to it.10
The Board’s Decision on Tom’s Administrative Complaint
The Court next analyzed the Board’s decision on Tom’s complaint. The Board
conducted an investigation on Tom's complaint and issued a notice to correct to IHS. The notice
from the investigator in this case directing IHS to make certain repairs did not determine the legal
rights, duties, or privileges of either party. The Board did not issue findings of fact and conclusions
of law. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Board’s decision cannot be characterized as a final
decision resolving a contested case and that no preclusive effect could be given to the Board's
decision on Tom's complaint.
The District Court’s Reliance on Advisory Opinions Addressing Other Matters
The Court noted that the district court also explicitly relied on three advisory
opinions. The Court concluded that in reviewing the questions addressed in the advisory opinions,
all three were factually dissimilar to the case at bar and the opinions were very brief, each
consisting only of a one-sentence statement of the issue and one or two sentences for the opinion.
The Court held that the district court erred in treating the Board’s letter closing Tom’s complaint
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as dispositive of the license issue. The Court futher concluded that the advisory opinions did not
support granting IHS summary judgment on that issue. Thus, the Court concluded that IHS failed
to meet its initial burden of production to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether it needed a license.
Breach of Contract
The Court next concluded that IHS had not met its burden of proving that no
genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether the contract was completed. The closing
of Tom’s Board complaint was not dispositive evidence that IHS completed the contract. Thus,
the Court held that summary judgment on this issue was improper as well.
Attorney’s Fees
Lastly, the Court noted that because of its conclusion that summary judgment was
inappropriate in this case, the award of attorney fees is necessarily vacated; thus, the Court did not
address this issue.
Conclusion
Because genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether IHS needed a license to
perform certain work under the contract and whether IHS completed the contract, the Court
reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment in IH’'s favor. Accordingly, the
Court also vacated the award of attorney fees and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

